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Abstract Artefacts are usually understood in contrast with natural kinds and con-
ceived as a unitary kind. Here we propose that there is in fact a variety of artefacts:
from the more concrete to the more abstract ones. Moreover, not every artefact is able
to fulfil its function thanks to its physical properties: Some artefacts, particularly what
we call “institutional” artefacts, are symbolic in nature and require a system of rules
to exist and to fulfil their function. Adopting a standard method to measure concep-
tual representation (the property generation task), we have experimentally explored
how humans conceptualise these different kinds of artefacts. Results indicate that
institutional artefacts are typically opposed to social objects, while being more similar
to standard artefacts, be they abstract or concrete.
1 Introduction
Artefacts come in great variety. Beside everyday tools like hammers and screw-
drivers, less concrete examples are a poem or a project. Even if these lack material
properties that can be readily tracked by our senses, they too are products of
intentional human action with a more or less recognizable function. Moreover, aside
from standard artefacts and tools, there is a domain of artefacts that is more symbolic
in nature and does not necessary rely on physical properties to achieve its intended
function. A check, for instance, is a typical example of institutional artefact whose
physical properties (i.e. being made of paper and with a standard shape and colour)
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are not enough to explain how it can be used to achieve its function. In order to
understand how an institutional artefact works, one has to consider the role played by
the system of rules within which it is inscribed and that of the social practice in which
it is included. If artefacts can be concrete and abstract, and standard and institutional
along these lines, is there a common way to conceptualize them as a unified category?
2 Varieties of Artefacts: Philosophy Meets Psychology
Philosophical discussion on the nature of artefacts has mainly examined them from
the outside, so to say, namely, as opposed to non-artefacts. This approach, however,
often under-represents all the several existing varieties of artefacts. In particular, the
main philosophical theories tend to oscillate among four different notions when
trying to account for artefacts in ontological terms. These notions are (1) intention,
(2) function, (3) history, and (4) action. Intentional theories of artefacts, as proposed
for example by Hilpinen (1993), analyze artefacts as imagined sortals with specific
criteria of identity in the mind of creators, thus considering the concept of “author”
and “authorship” as central when accounting for the artefactual domain. Functionalist
theories such as that proposed by Baker (2004), on the other hand, connect the
existence of artefacts with their capacity to perform a specific “essential” function,
thus inscribing the ontological structure of these objects within a necessary teleolog-
ical framework. Historical theories of artefacts highlight the connection that objects
of this sort have with a specific kind of history, namely, either a “deliberative” history
that in the end is rooted in human activities (see for example Dipert 1993) or an
evolutionary history of selection for their capability to be, in some sense, useful (see
Millikan 1984, 1999; Petroski 1993). Finally, action-oriented theories of artefacts (a
typical example being Houkes and Vermaas 2010) underline the role that use, and
more in general interaction patterns, have with artefactual objects, showing that an
account of the ontology of these objects depends on the “use plan” that they are built
for. Notwithstanding their differences, all the philosophical discussions mentioned so
far have mainly focused on artefactual kinds as a whole, namely, as distinguished
from natural kinds. Similarly, debates in psychology and neuroscience have studied
artefact categorization by distinguishing artefacts from natural objects. This has often
implied the adoption of an essentialist stance, i.e. the assumption that a concept refers
to a given category because it possesses given internal properties and that its surface
features are constrained by the deeper conceptual “core” (Medin and Ortony 1988). In
developmental research many studies focus on the distinction between natural objects
and artefacts, aiming at verifying to what extent children distinguish between cate-
gories of natural kinds, that would mark real distinctions existing in the world, and
categories which are the product of conventional or social rules (e.g., Gelman 2009).
Specifically, our species would be endowed with the belief that natural objects
possess a hidden essence that remains unchanged across mutations like growth and
reproduction; in contrast, what defines artefacts is their use and function, rather than
their internal parts. In the developmental context some authors have distinguished
among different kinds of artefacts, which are arranged along a continuum: for
example, Keil (1989) distinguished between complex and simple artefacts, such as
computers vs. hammers. The first are characterized by many internal parts, thus being
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more similar to natural objects, whereas the second are more simple and
“transparent”.
An important recent discussion, in deep continuity with the philosophical ones,
concerns the role played by the intention of the creator in the conceptualization of
artefacts and contrasts essentialist and anti-essentialist theories in this regard. Bloom
(1996), adopting an essentialist point of view, assigns a crucial role to the intention of
the creator: according to this approach, we decide that something belongs to a given
artefact category by inferring the intention behind its creation. In contrast with his
theory of artefacts based on intentional-history (see also Bloom 2007), Malt and
Sloman (2007) criticize psychological essentialism in favour of an account that
assigns a more important role to the actual situation of interaction. According to this
latter view, the naming of artefacts varies depending on the communicative situation,
and the role played by the creator’s intention can be flexibly modulated by the context
and task at hand. Other authors have proposed that the intentional and the affordance-
based view of artefacts are not mutually exclusive but rather compatible (e.g.,
Chaigneau et al. 2004).
Further research lines are relevant to understand how artefacts are conceptualized.
A very productive one stems from studies focusing on category-specific semantic
impairments, and particularly on the double dissociation between living and non-
living entities, artefacts being part of the latter (for a review see Gainotti 2000). In the
majority of these patients, knowledge of living entities, or a subset of them (e.g. fruit,
vegetables), is impaired, while a more reduced number of patients present a specific
deficit for non-living entities, i.e. artefacts. A wide literature has focused on these
double dissociations, and different accounts have been proposed. In light of our
distinction between concrete and abstract artefacts and between standard and institu-
tional artefacts, an important element in this literature is that non-living things are
often limited to tools, furniture, vehicles, and other concrete artefacts, while abstract
and institutional artefacts are typically ignored.
Finally, one further research line concerns the conceptualization of tools. Both
behavioural and brain-imaging studies have shown that the observation of tools
activate motor information (affordances), and that they are represented in the left
ventral areas of the brain (for a review, see Martin 2007). This evidence has been
taken to support embodied and grounded theories of categorization, according to
which the observation of objects evokes motor responses. This would be true in
particular for tools, which are linked to a specific function. The main problem with
this line of research is that it often focuses only on a subset of artefacts. For example,
due to the increased interest on the role of perception and action in conceptual
organization, many behavioural and brain-imaging studies have focused on tools
(for a review see Martin 2007). As a consequence, research highlighting the role of
action and function for artefacts tends to confine the investigation to specific and
well-defined artefact categories of “standard” concrete artefacts, such as tools, furni-
ture, vehicles, musical instruments, etc. Even though these studies have led to results
rich of theoretical implications for embodied cognition, it remains unclear to what
extent results obtained with a subset of items can be generalized to all kinds of
artefacts.
These research lines have two main consequences, which we will try to address in
our work. On the one hand, they have led researchers to ignore an important category
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of socially defined artefacts, such as institutional ones. On the other hand, they have
underestimated the importance of abstract artefacts (e.g., a project). In this paper, we
address this current limitation in the philosophical and psychological literature by
considering a richer artefactual domain that goes beyond everyday concrete artefacts:
institutional artefacts such as money, property, associations and other institutionally-
related symbolic objects. Institutional objects and facts have received a great deal of
attention in contemporary approaches to social ontology (see, among others, Gilbert
1989; Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995) but also in the field of legal philosophy (see for
example Lagerspetz 1995; MacCormick 2007). In these approaches institutional
objects and facts are mainly studied as belief-dependent phenomena, grounded on a
specific sort of “collective intentionality” which can be analyzed in many ways. The
artefactual nature of institutional objects has been discussed in particular by Searle in
the light of his theory of “status functions” (on which see Searle 1995, 39 ff.; 2010,
59 ff.). According to this theory, institutional objects are a particular kind of artefacts
that perform their function not in virtue of a given physical make-up but via the
collective acceptance displayed by a given community. Searle has analyzed how the
development of symbolic artefacts (among which language: see Searle 2010, chap. 4)
is a major step in the evolutionary history of the human kind, a step strongly
connected with the collective construction of institutional frameworks aimed at
building specialized roles for the enforcement of social norms (see in this regard also
Dubreil 2010). Despite this attention to the functional nature of institutional objects,
however, Searle has not explicitly defended this view in light of the articulated
philosophical discussion on the nature of artefacts. As a consequence, Searle’s theory
of status functions has been conceived more as a theory of social objects rather than
of a different kind of artefacts: a problem for social ontology rather than for the
ontology of artefacts. We think, for this reason, that the artefactual nature of institu-
tional objects is still to be fully understood, and that it can unlock new perspectives
on the ontology of artefacts as well as of institutions (previous attempts to link the
discussion on artefacts and that on institutions can be found in Thomasson 2003;
Tummolini and Castelfranchi 2006; Laurence and Margolis 2007).
Institutional artefacts, moreover, point to another feature of artefacts which seems
to be widely neglected in current research: artefacts can be abstract and not only
concrete, and hence have an immaterial nature. Consider works of literature, for
example, as opposed to other works of art such as sculptures and paintings (see
Thomasson 1999). Even though sculptures and painting have a fundamental semantic
content (which accounts for their “relational” nature), they also have a concrete and
material aspect, which can anchor their conceptualization and which cannot entirely
be dismissed in ontological discussion (compare the problem of “material constitu-
tion”: see Rea 1997). This is not true for poetry, fictions, and other works of literature,
whose nature is exclusively symbolic and abstract, to the point that these artefacts can
also “exist” (and in fact existed for centuries) independently of a written substratum
while still having the typical features of artefacts: they are the intentional product of
human activities, the outcome of creative processes, and fulfil specific expressive
functions. The same holds for institutional artefacts: The development of institutions
for exchanging goods, protecting one’s own possessions, or organizing lawmaking is
the outcome of human elaboration and intellectual work and must be inscribed within
a teleological and functional framework—these institutions exist, and their content
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must interpreted, to fulfil specific purposes in the light of a socially shared set of
values.
In what follows, we introduce an experiment designed to explore these issues.
3 Experimental Study
3.1 Motivation and Assumptions
The main question behind our experimental study is whether there are significant
common elements in the conceptualization of standard and institutional artefacts, but
also whether some important and equally significant difference emerges. Even if
institutional artefacts are indeed artefactual in nature, it cannot be denied that they are
peculiar in many respects. Additional questions relevant for evaluating the results of
our work are related to the current literature on artefacts and institutions: Do our
experimental results confirm, for example, the role that action, function, intention,
and history play as crucial concepts for the ontological assessment of artefacts? Are
these results in line with current psychological literature on artefacts? Can we find
support for the current thesis about institutional artefacts, namely, that they depend on
shared intentionality? And what is the role of rules in the conceptualization of these
peculiar artefacts?
The current study is based on four distinct methodological assumptions.
First, we have distinguished between concrete and abstract artefacts, both to study
the role of material composition in the conceptualization of standard artefacts and to
assess whether the symbolic and abstract character of institutional artefacts is relevant
to distinguish them from standard tools.
Second, we have combined the dichotomy abstract/concrete with the dichotomy
standard/institutional, thus obtaining a four-place taxonomy as follows:
(a) Concrete standard artefacts
(b) Abstract standard artefacts
(c) Concrete institutional artefacts
(d) Abstract institutional artefacts
The relevance we have decided to give to abstract artefacts in this study is new,
particularly if assessed from the point of view of embodied and grounded theories
(see Borghi and Pecher 2011). Actually, one of the big challenges for embodied and
grounded theories consists in being able to provide a convincing account of how
abstract entities are represented (Borghi and Cimatti 2009; Pecher et al. 2011; Scorolli
et al. 2012).
Third, we have chosen another category of concepts that are human-related but not
necessarily artefactual to serve as a contrast category both for artefacts and institu-
tions. We introduce the contrasting category of “social object” (e.g., choir, friend-
ship): a social object is an entity that presupposes the existence of at least two agents
engaged in some form of common activity and that, differently from institutional
objects, does not have a clear status function attached to it. The relevant question that
we address with this study is how both standard artefacts and institutional artefacts
interact with the contrast category of social entities: which of the two kinds, for
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example, is more similar to social entities with respect to their conceptual represen-
tation? This question is theoretically relevant also for embodied and grounded
theories of cognition since the role of the social dimension is often neglected (for
exceptions see Semin and Smith 2008; Galantucci and Sebanz 2009).
Fourth, we have assumed that the conceptualization of institutional artefacts may
be sensitive to the degree of expertise that subjects have with the institutional
framework of a given community, and hence we have divided our subjects in 4
groups:
(a) Undergraduate students in fields different from law (non-professional experts
and not in law)
(b) Expert researchers in fields different from law (professional experts but not in law)
(c) Law graduates (non-professional experts in law)
(d) Law professionals (professional experts in law).
Previous studies exploring the role of expertise in conceptual organization have
been focused only on expertise in concrete domains. For example, Medin et al. (1997)
investigated how taxonomists, landscape workers, and park maintenance personnel
categorize concrete items, such as trees. In the present work, we selected experts on
the basis of two criteria. First, given the aim of this work, we selected experts in the
legal domain, i.e. law graduates and law professionals, together with novices, i.e.
students of other fields. At the same time, since we are also interested in the
distinction between concrete and abstract artefacts, we selected experts who are
expected to possess a different degree of definitional capability. To this aim we had
a sample of researchers, our assumption being that they should be more accustomed
than students in providing precise definitions of abstract terms. If compared with
researchers, students are expected to bear on more commonsensical knowledge, while
graduates and professionals should possess a more specific and technical knowledge.
As far as we know, this is the first study focused on the impact of expertise on the
conceptualization of abstract and immaterial entities.
Finally, we have extended the opposition between abstract and concrete artefacts
also to institutional artefacts (see also Thomasson 2003). Even if all institutional
artefacts are characterized by a symbolic and abstract nature, some of them (such as
property or corporations) have an exclusively immaterial and symbolic content, while
others (such as banknotes) have a clear physical dimension. In fact, institutional
objects can be ordinary objects, states of affairs or events that simply acquire a new
status, or they can be objects specifically built for the purpose of being bearers of that
status, and in this case they have a material artefactual component (something similar
also happens in games of make-believe: see Walton 1990). Hence, despite their rule-
based content, institutions can have a material aspect, and thus it seems reasonable to
explore how this aspect interacts with the more symbolic and abstract one.
3.2 Predictions
Given these background assumptions, we have formulated the following predictions:
1. Abstract vs. concrete concepts. In line with embodied and grounded theories of
cognition (e.g., Borghi and Pecher 2011), we predict that both concrete and
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abstract concepts of all the selected categories are grounded in thematic relations
(i.e. are conceptualized as part of the same context), and particularly in action. In
addition, following Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), we predict that ab-
stract concepts evoke more introspective properties: we expect a higher frequen-
cy of mental associations with abstract concepts than with concrete ones.
2. Kinds of concepts. In line with the literature (e.g. Borghi and Caramelli 2003), we
predict that standard artefacts elicit mostly perceptual properties (e.g. parts) and
thematic relations, while social objects, which do not have a specific, concrete
referent, should be grounded referring to thematic relations only, and should elicit
mostly situations. As to institutional artefacts, we intend to explore whether they
can be more easily assimilated to standard artefacts or to social entities.
3. Expertise. In contrast with a strong essentialist view, we predict that conceptual
organization is not fixed but modulated by different kinds of expertise.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Design and Participants
Three independent manipulated variables structured the experiment: the variables
kind of artefact (standard artefact, institutional artefact, social entity) and concept type
(abstract vs. concrete concepts), manipulated within subjects, and the variable exper-
tise (undergraduate students, researchers, law professionals, graduate students in law)
manipulated between subjects. Participants were 20 volunteers divided in 4 groups of
5 subjects each: 5 undergraduate students of the University of Bologna in fields
different from law (non-professional experts and not in law), 5 researchers of the
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome, in fields different from law
(professional experts but not in law), 5 law graduates from the University of Bologna
(non-professional experts in law), and 5 law professionals (professional experts in
law) who work in the Bologna area.
3.3.2 Materials
An initial list of 90 concept-nouns, divided in 3 categories (standard artefacts,
institutional artefacts and social entities) was created. From this initial list we selected
78 concepts, on which there was agreement between the 3 co-authors, and submitted
these concepts to participants. Finally, in order to perform the analyses for the current
study we selected a sub-set of 12 representative nouns, 2 instances for each category,
divided into abstract and concrete (concrete standard artefacts: screwdriver and
painting; abstract standard artefacts: poetry and project; concrete institutional arte-
facts: signature and check; abstract institutional artefacts: association and ownership;
concrete social entities: party and choir; abstract social entities: friendship and
disagreement). All the selected concepts were countable nouns. It should be noted,
on the basis of this list, that our examples of institutional artefacts, if compared with
social objects, are characterized by having a more or less identifiable status function:
e.g., once a name written on paper is recognised as a “signature”, it also acquires a
function (Searle 1995, 2010; Tummolini and Castelfranchi 2006).
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3.3.3 Procedure
We have adopted a standard method for assessing conceptual content: the property
generation task (see for example Wu and Barsalou 2009; Borghi and Caramelli 2003).
Participants received a cue noun, and had to write at least 5 typical properties they
associated to it. The 12 selected nouns were presented in two different random orders.
3.4 Data Analysis and Results
All the properties produced were coded by 3 independent judges (the 3 co-authors of
the present work) according to the relation between the property and the concept
under consideration. The 3 judges, who were aware of the aims of the experiment,
had 6,68 % of disagreements, all solved after discussion.
According to the categorization literature, a given object can be categorized
taxonomically, as member of the same category (e.g., hammer-tool) or thematically,
as part of the same context or action (e.g., hammers and nails) (Borghi and Caramelli
2003; Kalénine et al. 2009; Estes et al. 2011). In addition, it can be categorized
through attributive and partonomic properties. Here we selected attributive properties
(partonomic and proper) and thematic relations (including spatial, temporal,
action/function and situational relations). As to taxonomic properties, given our focus
on abstract concepts we selected only instantiations, because we were interested in
verifying whether a high degree of abstractness would lead to the need to instantiate.
Finally, we also included mental associations relations, because according to
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) introspective properties and associations
should be more typical of abstract than of concrete concepts, and normative relations,
which might be relevant for abstract concepts such as the institutional ones. On the
basis of these norms, the coded relations were grouped under 10 different kinds:
(1) Mental association (property P is connected with the object O by mere mental
association) (e.g., project-future)
(2) Partonomic/Part of (P is a material part, or an essential element, of O) (e.g.,
screwdriver-handle)
(3) Partonomic/Whole (O is a part, or an essential element, of P) (e.g., painting-
collection)
(4) Proper (P is a property of O) (e.g., disagreement-conflict)
(5) Thematic/Spatial relation (e.g., party-swimming pool)
(6) Thematic/Temporal relation (e.g., party-Carnival)
(7) Thematic/Action/Function relation (P is something you can do with O) (e.g.,
friendship-hug);
(8) Thematic/Situational relation (P is a typical social situation or context in which
O obtains/has a role) (e.g., choir-concert)
(9) Normative relation (P is an element that norms of a given institution connect
with O) (e.g., signature-attestation)
(10) Taxonomic/Exemplification relation (P is a typical example of O) (e.g.,
ownership-house).
We computed the frequency and the percentage of all the produced relations for
each category independently of the degree of abstractness and expertise. The
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percentages reported in Fig. 1a show the relevance that the different kinds of relation
have in eliciting properties for each of the categories under scrutiny. Then we
performed a correspondence analysis (Fig. 1b) in order to verify whether the distri-
bution of the frequencies of the relations varied across the categories we have
selected. In correspondence analyses, which are based on the chi square test, the
frequencies of the produced relations, from which a broad data matrix is derived,
allow the identification of the weight of the different coded dimensions and their
graphical representation. On the graph, the geometrical proximity of the points shows
the similarity of their distribution (Hair et al. 1992; Greenacre and Blasius 1994).
Figure 1a shows an overall relevance of the action/function relation, in particular
for what regards standard artefacts and concepts of social entities, and of exemplifi-
cations, in particular for institutional artefacts. Apart from this general trend, pecu-
liarities emerge in connection with the three different kinds of categories. The
partonomic relation plays an important role with standard artefacts, but not so much
with institutional artefacts and concepts of social entities. Institutional artefacts are
instead interestingly connected with normative relations, whereas social entities elicit
a higher percentage of properties (proper relation) and/or contextual considerations
(situation relation) when compared to the other two categories.
Figure 1b shows the correspondence analysis performed on the frequencies of the
relations produced with the 3 categories (standard artefact, institutional artefact, and
social entity). Dimension 1, which accounted for 68 % of the total variance, was
explained by the opposition between concepts of social entities characterized by
situational and action relations, to institutional artefacts and institutional artefacts
characterized by normative relations. On the vertical Dimension 2 (32 % of the
variance), instead, an opposition between standard artefacts and social entities
emerges: the former are characterized by partonomic relations (part of and whole)
while the latter by temporal and spatial relations. This confirms the relevance of
contextual considerations for social concepts. Interestingly, the major differences
oppose institutional and standard artefacts to social entities, while the opposition
between institutional and standard has less weight.
We then computed the frequency of the produced relations for each category
divided into abstract and concrete concepts, and then we performed a correspondence
analysis (Fig. 2). Hence, it is shown here how different kinds of relations characterize
the concepts, taking into account both their kind (standard artefact, institutional
artefact, social entity) and whether they are abstract or concrete.
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Figure 2 confirms on Dimension 1 (40 % of the variance) the opposition between
concepts of social entities and of institutional artefacts, but specifies this opposition in
connection with the abstract/concrete dichotomy. Indeed, concrete and abstract insti-
tutional artefacts, characterized by exemplification and normative relations, differ
from abstract social entities characterized by situations. Thus, the relevance of
exemplification and normative relations for institutional artefacts holds independently
of the fact that institutional artefacts are abstract or concrete, whereas the relevance of
situational relations for social concepts in opposition to institutional artefacts is more
specifically connected to abstract than to concrete social concepts. This does not
mean, however, that contextual considerations are irrelevant in conceptual represen-
tation of concrete social entities: On the contrary, the main opposition that emerges
from Dimension 2 (33 % of the variance) is between abstract and concrete social
entities, and these last are characterized by thematic relations, i.e. by action, spatial
and temporal relations (and hence, again, by contextual considerations, only more
“concretely” defined), whereas abstract social entities elicit mental associations more
often.
Finally, we computed the frequency and the percentage for all categories of the
relations produced by each group of subjects (students, law graduates, researchers,
law professionals). Then we performed three correspondence analyses focused on the
relations produced for each category (standard artefact, institutional artefact and
social entity) by each group. Note that, in the first correspondence analysis, temporal
and normative relations were excluded because their frequency was = 0, and the same
holds for partonomic and normative relations in the third analysis. For space reasons
we report the percentages on Table 1 and describe the results of the correspondence
analyses, which show different oppositions with regard to expertise depending on the
kind of concepts we are considering.
The analysis on standard artefacts shows on Dimension 1 (67 % of the variance) a
strong difference between researchers and professionals, in the fact that the former
focus more on partonomic (part of or whole) relations whereas the latter appeal to
exemplification, mental association or situational relations. In the vertical dimension,
which accounts for 28 % of the total variance, graduates focus more on proper
relations while students appeal more to spatial relations. The analysis regarding
institutional artefacts shows the opposition between researchers and students (68 %
of the variance). Hence, the more relevant opposition concerning institutional arte-
facts emerges, quite surprisingly, between non-professional and professional experts,
Fig. 2 Correspondence analysis on the produced relations for concrete and abstract terms of each selected
category
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but not in law. Relations produced by researchers are characterized by proper re-
lations and therefore focus on specific properties of institutional artefacts, while
students insist more on other kinds of association (partonomic, spatial and mental
association relations). On Dimension 2 (21 % of the variance), law professionals are
opposed to graduates in law in that the latter tend to appeal more to exemplification
relations. The analysis on social entities shows on Dimension 1 (80 % of the variance)
an opposition between researchers, who produce mostly proper and exemplification
relations, and both students and graduates, who instead focus more on action and
mental association relations. On the vertical dimension, instead, a weak opposition
(15 % of the variance) can be seen between law professionals, who appeal to
temporal relations, and students, who instead insist in particular on partonomic (part
of) relations.
4 Discussion
In light of these results, at least four points are worth discussing: (a) the general
relevance of the action relation; (b) the peculiarity of institutional artefacts; (c) the
small impact that the dichotomy abstract/concrete has both on standard and institu-
tional artefacts; and (d) the impact of expertise. Let us consider these points in order,
taking also into account the predictions formulated under Section 3.2 above.
Figure 1 in particular directly confirms prediction (1) above. First, and in line with
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), mental associations are indeed relevant for
abstract concepts: particularly for abstract concepts of social entities. The action
relation is extremely relevant for all kinds of concepts—the most relevant concerning
standard artefacts and social entities, the second most relevant concerning institu-
tional artefacts. When assessing this result in view of the abstract/concrete distinction,
something even more significant emerges: The action relation is crucial for artefacts,
be they abstract or concrete, while it is less important (although still relevant) when
dealing with abstract institutional and social entities. In these cases, the absence of a
concrete referent seems to reduce the role of an action-oriented conceptualization and
instead to proceed in other directions.
A major point comes up when considering how those directions differ, and thus
how institutional artefacts are peculiar. There is indeed a strong opposition between
social entities and institutional artefacts: as is clear from Figs. 1a and 2, the former are
strongly linked with contextual considerations—typical situations, spatio-temporal
co-located entities or events—while the latter are conceptualized by means of a
stronger focus on normative relations and exemplifications. As far as everyday
categorization is concerned, this result seems to significantly weaken the subsump-
tion of institutional artefacts in the broader category of social objects, an approach
that is given for granted in contemporary social ontology. Indeed, if these results were
confirmed by further research, the “entrenchment” in a given social community, and
thus the reference to typical situations and spatio-temporal location, would be
connected to social entities but not necessarily to institutional facts. Conceptual
representation of institutional entities seems to loose their connection with their social
origins: instead, the assessment of institutional entities would require a higher degree
of “technical” considerations, with a stronger reference to other normatively-
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connected institutional concepts and the need to exemplify by means of paradigmatic
cases. In a broader perspective, one could consider whether these results also weaken
the current social-ontological conception of institutional facts according to which
these are to be conceived as the content of shared mental states within a given
community: the so-called “collective intentionality view” (Searle 1995, 2010;
Tuomela 2002). On the one hand, the prevalence of normative relations is coherent
with the role that “deontic powers” have for example in Searle’s view (see Searle
1995, 95ff.). On the other hand, however, the stress on socially-contextualized mental
contents, which is typical of collective acceptance, does not find clear confirmation in
our results: it seems instead that institutional objects are conceptualized with refer-
ence to less subjective criteria such as systematic relations and paradigmatic
examples.
In contrast, our results support the artefactual conception of institutions we have
been arguing for at the beginning of this paper. First, there is no opposition in Figs. 1b
and 2 between institutional and standard artefacts: indeed, while institutional artefacts
have their peculiarities, the major opposition here is between social entities and
institutional artefacts, and it is worth noting that an opposition also emerges between
social entities and standard artefacts. This last opposition is particularly informative.
Differently from concepts of social entities, which are characterized through contex-
tual location, concepts of standard artefacts make stronger reference to partonomic
considerations—something which they are part of and something which is part of
them (this confirms prediction (2) above). Similar directions (holistic reference to the
broader framework and specific reference to concrete instantiations) can be identified
in the reference that concepts of institutional artefacts typically make to other
normatively-related concepts (and hence to the broader normative system) as well
as to paradigmatic cases.
Another important consideration that seems to connect standard artefacts and
institutions—which is point (c) among those listed at the beginning of this section—is
that in both cases there is no opposition between abstract and concrete cases, while
there is considerable opposition between concepts of abstract and concrete social
entities. This means that, even if one considers the important role of partonomic
considerations in the conceptualization of standard artefacts to count as a major
difference with respect to the normative relations relevant in the case of
institutions—and we have seen that it is not so, in our view—nevertheless it cannot
be denied that, according to these results, the abstract/concrete dichotomy has less
impact in standard artefacts and institutions than in the case of social entities. The role
of partonomic relations, in the first case, and of normative relations in the second
does not change very much when moving from concrete to abstract cases, while in the
social domain spatial and temporal relations, which are very relevant for concrete
entities, must in a sense be “transformed” in more abstract situational contexts when
dealing with abstract entities.
Finally, as predicted (see prediction (3) above), we found that the relations
produced are modulated by expertise. This suggests that an essentialist explanation,
based on the idea that some properties invariantly characterize folk conceptualization,
cannot account for our results. Two points are worth discussing. First, our results
suggest a different ability of the different professional groups to cope with abstract-
ness. Indeed, researchers compared to other groups tend to produce more proper
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relations with terms that do not have a concrete and specific referent, such as
institutional artefacts and social entities, and to produce partonomic properties when
dealing with artefacts, in line with the literature. In contrast with the literature,
instead, professionals produce a lot of exemplifications as well as mental associations
with artefacts, while they oppose to graduates characterized by exemplifications with
institutional artefacts. This testifies their need to instantiate and ground artefacts in
order to represent them, while this need is not present with entities they are more
familiar with, namely, institutional ones.
In our opinion, these results on expertise cast some doubts on a strong essentialist
approach. At a general level, as briefly discussed in the Introduction, we think that
there is substantial evidence against essentialism in studies on artefacts. However, an
alternative explanation of our results on expertise can be advanced. Santos et al.
(2011; see also Barsalou et al. 2008) have claimed that the property generation task
draws on at least two different systems, the linguistic form system and the situated
simulation system, and subjects appeal to these systems at different moments. Hence
it could be that, for some reason, one group of subjects tends to use more frequently
one system than the other, and this is why their associations are different.
There are two reasons why we do not think that this explanation can fully account
for our results. The first reason is a methodological one. Being aware of possible
problems, we took care in selecting our methodology. We avoided on purpose to use a
word association task and chose instead a property generation task: the initial burst of
associate words characterizes more the first than the second more controlled property
generation tasks (even if Santos et al. 2011 discuss property generation tasks as well).
Further, in order to reduce the initial burst of free associations, we asked participants
to perform a written feature listing task rather than an oral one, and we did not set any
time restriction for the property generation.
The second reason is theoretical. As argued elsewhere (see Borghi and Cimatti
2009; Borghi In press), we have proposed the WAT (Words As Social Tools) theory
on abstract concepts, which presents many similarities with the LASS (Language and
Situated Simulation) theory (see Barsalou et al. 2008; Santos et al. 2011), in particular
because it argues that concepts rely on multiple representations, both linguistic and
non-linguistic. However, differently from the proponents of LASS, we do not think
that linguistic and non-linguistic representation differ in depth, since we consider the
linguistic experience a sensorimotor experience among others. Hence we believe that
also word associations give access to conceptual meaning. However, let us assume
the LASS theory and interpret our results on expertise on that basis: we can suppose
that differences between groups emerge because a group of participants uses one
system more frequently when compared to the others. We believe that this is not a
problem for our claims, since it would testify that different experience modifies some
aspects of conceptual representation. Nevertheless, authors favouring psychological
essentialism could argue that these differences pertain to the superficial aspects of the
concepts, and not to the conceptual “essence”, or “core”. Whether this is true or not
can only be determined by means of further analyses, for example by analysing the
production order of the different characteristics, and by realizing further control
experiments along the lines of those performed by Santos et al. (2011).
Finally, a note of caution is necessary. The number of subjects used in this study is
limited but in line with the sample size typically used in property generation tasks
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(e.g., Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005). Still, the number of participants included
in each expert group is not very large. Hence, our conclusions on expertise are more
speculative than the other conclusions drawn in this study, which rely on the
properties generated by all subjects.
5 Conclusions
The philosophy of artefacts and the psychology of artefact categorization have
traditionally assumed that artefacts are a unitary kind and have explored how we
represent something as an artefact, as opposed to a natural kind. In this paper, we
have challenged these traditional approaches and have started to explore how the
different species of artefacts are conceptually represented. To do so, we have
designed an experiment to elicit the conceptual representations of a variety of
artefacts: from abstract to concrete ones, from standard to institutional ones. Results
have confirmed that institutional objects are represented similarly to standard arte-
facts and thus could be understood as artefacts in a proper sense. In contrast with what
prevalent views in social ontology would suggest, institutional objects are represented
differently from social objects. Whether a more developed artefactual approach to
institutions is able to deal with all the complications of social and legal reality will be
the object of future research.
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